Potential Non-US Grain Supplies for the USSR, 1983 Marketing Year

Million Tons

	Current Production	Total Export Supplies	Committed Exports a		Uncommitted
			Non-USS	R USSR	Exports
Total	332.5	82.6	40.4	17.0	25.2
Argentina	28.9	17.0	2.5	5.5	9.0
Australia	19.0	14.0	10.0	0	4.0
Canada	47.8	24.3	10.0	10.0	4.3
Eastern Europe	96.2	1.0	0	1.0	0
European Community	124.6	19.0	13.0	0	6.0
South Africa	11.4	4.3	4.3	0	0
Thailand	4.6	3.0	0.6	0.5	1.9

^a The figures for non-USSR committed exports include both long-term grain agreements and likely exports to major traditional customers.

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WESTERN EUROPE - USSR: Pipeline Develop	ments	
The French Government's announcement yeste companies to fulfill all existing contracts with first direct attempt by the West Europeans to ci sanctions.	i the USSR is the	
Comment: The French movewhich fo Atlantique to fulfill its contract of No supply 40 sets of turbine rotors manufac cense from General Electricmay encoura European governments to defy the sanctio Europeans may have, in fact, coordinated to some degree already.	vember 1981 to tured under li- ge other West ns. The West their efforts	25X
The decision by France marks a majo for the USSR in its efforts to circumven tions. Delivery of the 40 Alsthom rotor were intended originally as spares for the built by GE, could enable the three W turbine builders to meet their initial dations to the Soviets.	t the US sanc- s, which probably he 120 rotors to est European elivery obliga-	25X
In addition to the 40 rotors in Als contract, a total of some 20 GE-produced by Nuovo Pignone of Italy, John Brown of AEG-Kanis of West Germany. These rotors GE before the imposition of sanctions la Their delivery was to have begun this most soviets gave the West Europeans until each decide whether or not to defy US sanctions.	rotors are held the UK, and were shipped by st December. nth, but the rly August to	25X
If the West Europeans now decide to the turbines, Moscow would have half of watt turbines planned for the pipeline. these turbines would allow operation of around 90 percent of capacity. Delivering total about 28 billion cubic meters annual contracts total only 22 billion cubic meters.	the 120 25-mega- Installing just the pipeline at es then could ally; current	
To acquire the remaining 60 or so to for the pipeline, the Soviets could contithe needed rotors from Alsthomthe only a license to produce the GE-designed rotocould produce turbines of their own designed manufacturing assistance from West	ract to purchase company holding ors. They also gn, possibly	

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USSR: Status of Grain Crop	
The grain crop in the USSR this year probably will amount to only about 165 million tons, and it could be considerably lower.	25X
Drought and hot, dry winds in mid-June in the main spring wheat belt substantially reduced potential yields of both winter and spring grains. A more intensive drought in the first two weeks of July hit when grain kernels were forming.	
Comment: Another bout of hot, dry weather in the spring grain areas or a prolonged harvest in the European USSRwhich could subject late-sown spring grain to early, killing frostscould result in a crop far smaller than the unofficially reported 158-million-ton harvest in 1981.	
Moscow's long-range plans to become less dependent on grain imports from the West have been thwarted again. Regardless of the actual harvest, the USSR this year may import as much as 50 million tons of grainsomewhat above the record level in 1981 of 46 million tons. With bumper harvests and record grain stocks in key exporting countries, the Soviets will have little difficulty lining up these imports.	
The USSR is likely to obtain some grain from the US. If Moscow decides to avoid the US market, however, nearly the entire amount probably could be obtained from other major exportersespecially Canada, Argentina, Australia, and the EC countriesif it is willing to pay a premium to obtain grain scheduled for other countries.	25X
A fourth consecutive poor grain crop and the resulting lackluster overall agricultural performance jeopardize President Brezhnev's promise last May of an improved food supply in 1982. Even with heavy grain imports, a 165-million-ton crop would leave the USSR far short of the quantities of grain required to meet domestic needs.	25X
The crucial shortage of livestock feed could be eased by a reduction of grain directed to food and industrial uses. Nonetheless, some distress slaughter, primarily of hogs, would be necessary to alleviate the shortage. Even with this additional meat available, meat production this year would fall below the level in 1981 of 15.2 million tons.	

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